The month of August has come and gone and I struggle to pinpoint any new, clear-cut common themes. There has been plenty of news and developments for financial markets to digest and react to, including North Korea’s recent missile launch over Japanese airspace, the devastating impact of hurricane Harvey in Texas, the looming US debt ceiling breach, President Trump’s threats of terminating/re-negotiating NAFTA, ongoing Brexit negotiations between the UK and European Union and French President Macron’s announcement of ambitious labour market reforms.
Read 'We know what you did this summer' on my website in full.
Welcome to the Olivier Desbarres Blogger. Here you will find links to all of my latest Global and Macro Economic research pieces.
Showing posts with label 2017. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2017. Show all posts
Friday, 1 September 2017
Tuesday, 8 August 2017
Broken Records
The past year has been remarkable with political precedents set in the US, UK and France, still record-low central bank policy rates in most developed economies and financial markets and macro data at all-time or multi-year highs (and lows).
The US presidency is fraught with problems but markets turning are a blind eye…for now. The UK is still on course to be first ever member state to leave the European Union come 29th March 2019, at least on paper. French elections have repainted the political landscape and present many opportunities but old (fiscal) hurdles still need to be cleared.
Central bank policy rates remain at record lows in the majority of developed economies, including the Eurozone, UK, Japan, Australia and New Zealand and I expect this to remain the case for the remainder of the year. Loose global monetary policy is likely to continue providing a floor to risky assets, including equities and emerging market currencies.
A number of central banks have hiked 25bp in recent months, including the Fed, BoC and CNB, in line with my year-old view that rate hikes would gradually replace rate cuts. But in aggregate the turnaround in developed central bank monetary policy is proceeding at a glacial pace and I see few reasons why this should change.
The Bank of England has not hiked its policy rate for 526 weeks – a domestic record – and I continue to believe that this stretch will extend into 2018.
In contrast to the Dollar and Sterling, the Euro – by far the most stable major currency in the past seven years – has appreciated over 7% since early April.
While the ECB may want to slow the current rapid pace of Euro appreciation, it is unlikely to stop, let alone reverse, the Euro’s upward path at this stage. For starters, Eurozone growth and labour markets continue to strengthen. The German IFO business climate index hit three consecutive record highs in June-August.
Perhaps the most obvious record which financial markets have broken is the continued climb in US equities to new highs and volatility’s fall to near-record lows.
Emerging market rates continue to edge lower in the face of receding inflationary risks and I see room for further rate cuts, particularly in Brazil given the pace of Real appreciation.
Non-Japan Asian (NJA) currencies continue to broadly tread water, in line with my core view that NJA central banks have little incentive to materially alter their currencies’ paths.
Year-to-date emerging market equities have rallied 24%, twice as fast as the Dow Jones (12%) which has rallied twice as fast as EM currencies versus the Dollar (6%).
The US presidency is fraught with problems but markets turning are a blind eye…for now. The UK is still on course to be first ever member state to leave the European Union come 29th March 2019, at least on paper. French elections have repainted the political landscape and present many opportunities but old (fiscal) hurdles still need to be cleared.
Central bank policy rates remain at record lows in the majority of developed economies, including the Eurozone, UK, Japan, Australia and New Zealand and I expect this to remain the case for the remainder of the year. Loose global monetary policy is likely to continue providing a floor to risky assets, including equities and emerging market currencies.
A number of central banks have hiked 25bp in recent months, including the Fed, BoC and CNB, in line with my year-old view that rate hikes would gradually replace rate cuts. But in aggregate the turnaround in developed central bank monetary policy is proceeding at a glacial pace and I see few reasons why this should change.
The Bank of England has not hiked its policy rate for 526 weeks – a domestic record – and I continue to believe that this stretch will extend into 2018.
In contrast to the Dollar and Sterling, the Euro – by far the most stable major currency in the past seven years – has appreciated over 7% since early April.
While the ECB may want to slow the current rapid pace of Euro appreciation, it is unlikely to stop, let alone reverse, the Euro’s upward path at this stage. For starters, Eurozone growth and labour markets continue to strengthen. The German IFO business climate index hit three consecutive record highs in June-August.
Perhaps the most obvious record which financial markets have broken is the continued climb in US equities to new highs and volatility’s fall to near-record lows.
Emerging market rates continue to edge lower in the face of receding inflationary risks and I see room for further rate cuts, particularly in Brazil given the pace of Real appreciation.
Non-Japan Asian (NJA) currencies continue to broadly tread water, in line with my core view that NJA central banks have little incentive to materially alter their currencies’ paths.
Year-to-date emerging market equities have rallied 24%, twice as fast as the Dow Jones (12%) which has rallied twice as fast as EM currencies versus the Dollar (6%).
Read 'Broken Records' in full on my website.
Monday, 26 June 2017
H2 2017: Something old, something new, something revisited
As we head towards the second half of 2017 and the one-year anniversary of the UK referendum on EU membership, many themes which have pre-occupied financial markets in the past 12 months are likely to continue dominating headlines.
These include Donald Trump’s US presidency and its longevity, merits and scope for tax reforms and infrastructural spending, Brexit negotiations which officially started on 19th June and the resilience of the ongoing recovery in global GDP growth.
Global GDP growth rose modestly in Q1 2017 to around 3.12% year-on-year from 3.06% in Q4 2016 and a multi-year low of 2.8% yoy in Q2 2016, according to my estimates.
But the global manufacturing PMI averaged 52.7 in April-May, down slightly from 52.9 in Q1 2017, suggesting global GDP growth may not have accelerated further in Q2. This could in turn, at the margin, delay or temper policy rate hikes and/or unwinding of QE programs.
Non-Japan Asian currencies have in the past month been even more stable than in the preceding month, in line with my expectations, but a more pronounced policy change – particularly in China – remains a possibility.
Other themes, such as the timing and magnitude of higher policy rates in developed economies and falling international oil prices, have recently come into clearer focus and will likely be of central importance in H2.
For the UK, I am sticking to my view that a 25bp policy rate hike this year is still a low probability event and I see little chance of an August hike.
The uncertainty over the MPC’s interest rate path and the government’s stance on Brexit complicate any forecast of Sterling near and medium-term but I continue to see the risks biased towards further depreciation.
In France, the hype surrounding Emmanuel Macron’s presidential and legislative election victories is already giving way to whether, when and how smoothly the LREM-MoDem rainbow government can push through its reformist agenda.
Finally, while most European elections are now thankfully behind us, European financial markets are likely to attach great importance to the outcome of Germany’s general election on 24th September.
Conversely, the burning topic of rising European nationalism and future of the eurozone/EU has lost traction following recent presidential and/or legislative elections in France, the UK, Netherlands and Austria.
Read my revisit of H2 of 2017 on my website.
Labels:
2017,
Olivier Desbarres,
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Wednesday, 7 June 2017
UK General Election Scenario Analysis: Impact on Policy, Theresa May and Sterling
In less than 24 hours the British electorate will start voting in the election for the 650-seat House of Commons with the result expected early in the morning of Friday 9th June.
While the last general election was only held two years ago, there is arguably as much if not more at stake this time round than in May 2015.
Opinion polls still point to the ruling Conservatives winning a record-high 44% of the national vote ahead of the opposition Labour Party, but polling agencies which in the past have misestimated true voting intentions still display great inconsistency.
Ultimately it is the number of seats which British parties command which matters and the UK’s first-past-the-post electoral system makes it difficult to predict.
You Gov’s constituency-specific model forecasts the Conservatives winning only 304 seats as a result of a record number of “wasted” votes, a 26-seat loss and well short of both a working and absolute majority. Labour would increase its seat numbers from 229 to 266.
This would result in a hung parliament and either a coalition or minority government.
My own model points to the Conservatives winning around 360 seats (55.4% of total) and Labour 212 seats. Admittedly, this prediction is based on a number of assumptions, namely the net share of votes which Conservatives gain from other parties as well as voter turnout.
Whether the Conservatives significantly improve on their current 330 seats or fail to secure a parliamentary majority remains a tough call and there is an almost infinite number of possible outcomes.
However, I have narrowed down in Figure 10 the number of seats the Conservatives could win to eight possible scenarios, in each case assessing i) Their probability; ii) Their numerical impact on the Conservatives’ majority (or lack thereof); and iii) The risk of opposition parties and/or Conservative backbenchers high-jacking the policy agenda.
Figure 11 assesses for each of the eight scenarios their likely impact on iv) Theresa May’s standing within the Conservative Party and v) Sterling and currency volatility.
Regardless of what happens tomorrow, two events beyond British shores also scheduled for 8th June – the ECB’s policy meeting and Former FBI Director James Comey’s testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee – will conceivably exacerbate Sterling volatility.
While the last general election was only held two years ago, there is arguably as much if not more at stake this time round than in May 2015.
Opinion polls still point to the ruling Conservatives winning a record-high 44% of the national vote ahead of the opposition Labour Party, but polling agencies which in the past have misestimated true voting intentions still display great inconsistency.
Ultimately it is the number of seats which British parties command which matters and the UK’s first-past-the-post electoral system makes it difficult to predict.
You Gov’s constituency-specific model forecasts the Conservatives winning only 304 seats as a result of a record number of “wasted” votes, a 26-seat loss and well short of both a working and absolute majority. Labour would increase its seat numbers from 229 to 266.
This would result in a hung parliament and either a coalition or minority government.
My own model points to the Conservatives winning around 360 seats (55.4% of total) and Labour 212 seats. Admittedly, this prediction is based on a number of assumptions, namely the net share of votes which Conservatives gain from other parties as well as voter turnout.
Whether the Conservatives significantly improve on their current 330 seats or fail to secure a parliamentary majority remains a tough call and there is an almost infinite number of possible outcomes.
However, I have narrowed down in Figure 10 the number of seats the Conservatives could win to eight possible scenarios, in each case assessing i) Their probability; ii) Their numerical impact on the Conservatives’ majority (or lack thereof); and iii) The risk of opposition parties and/or Conservative backbenchers high-jacking the policy agenda.
Figure 11 assesses for each of the eight scenarios their likely impact on iv) Theresa May’s standing within the Conservative Party and v) Sterling and currency volatility.
Regardless of what happens tomorrow, two events beyond British shores also scheduled for 8th June – the ECB’s policy meeting and Former FBI Director James Comey’s testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee – will conceivably exacerbate Sterling volatility.
Read 'UK General Election Scenario Analysis - Impact on Policy, Theresa May and Sterling' in full on my website.
Labels:
2017,
Elections,
Olivier Desbarres,
UK
Friday, 2 June 2017
UK Election Special – When Two Tribes Go To War
British voters will on Thursday 8th June vote on the composition of the 650-seat House of Commons – the third major popular vote in two years – after Prime Minister Theresa May’s decision back in April to trigger early general elections.
Theresa May’s motivations were arguably four-fold: (1) Win a popular rather than party mandate, (2) Capitalise on the massive lead in the polls the ruling Conservatives enjoyed over the opposition Labour Party and thus allow her to push through her own agenda, including a possibly softer form of Brexit, (3) Allow the government more time to secure a new EU trade deal, and (4) Strengthen the government’s stance in negotiations with the EU.
Objectives (1) and (3) will likely be met but objectives (2) and (4) may prove more elusive.
Opinion polls point to a trend-fall in popular support for the Conservatives to around 44% and sharp rise for Labour to 35%, with the gap between the two main parties halving to about 9pp from 20pp six weeks ago. Aggregate support for the Liberal Democrats, UKIP, SNP and Green Party is flat-lining around 18%.
However, there is still great discrepancy amongst polling agencies which in the past have misestimated true voting intentions. Moreover the UK’s first-past-the-post electoral system makes it difficult to translate share of votes into seats numbers. Whether the Conservatives significantly improve on their current 330 seats or fail to secure a parliamentary majority, as You Gov currently predicts, is a tough call.
Nevertheless, a number of important themes have emerged in recent months.
First, the slingshot campaign has exposed the frailty and flaws of the Conservative machine, including of its leader and manifesto, and reinforced my view, first set out in December, that the government is ill-equipped, ill-prepared and lacking in institutional capacity to negotiate complex deals with the EU and non-EU partners.
Second, it is a two-horse race between the ruling Conservatives and Labour, with the other parties on course to secure only a modest number of seats – a break with recent elections.
Finally, the political centre of gravity has shifted to the left, with in particular tax rates likely to rise regardless of which party wins next week’s election.
My core scenario is a hollow victory for the Conservatives: 360-370 seats with a low voter turnout. This would reduce the risk of opposition parties and rebel Conservative MPs torpedoing government legislation but would fall short of the landslide victory which Conservatives thought possible back in April.
Finally, a modest (or even significant) increase in the Conservative’s parliamentary majority is unlikely to materially improve the government’s hand when negotiating with the EU.
Theresa May’s motivations were arguably four-fold: (1) Win a popular rather than party mandate, (2) Capitalise on the massive lead in the polls the ruling Conservatives enjoyed over the opposition Labour Party and thus allow her to push through her own agenda, including a possibly softer form of Brexit, (3) Allow the government more time to secure a new EU trade deal, and (4) Strengthen the government’s stance in negotiations with the EU.
Objectives (1) and (3) will likely be met but objectives (2) and (4) may prove more elusive.
Opinion polls point to a trend-fall in popular support for the Conservatives to around 44% and sharp rise for Labour to 35%, with the gap between the two main parties halving to about 9pp from 20pp six weeks ago. Aggregate support for the Liberal Democrats, UKIP, SNP and Green Party is flat-lining around 18%.
However, there is still great discrepancy amongst polling agencies which in the past have misestimated true voting intentions. Moreover the UK’s first-past-the-post electoral system makes it difficult to translate share of votes into seats numbers. Whether the Conservatives significantly improve on their current 330 seats or fail to secure a parliamentary majority, as You Gov currently predicts, is a tough call.
Nevertheless, a number of important themes have emerged in recent months.
First, the slingshot campaign has exposed the frailty and flaws of the Conservative machine, including of its leader and manifesto, and reinforced my view, first set out in December, that the government is ill-equipped, ill-prepared and lacking in institutional capacity to negotiate complex deals with the EU and non-EU partners.
Second, it is a two-horse race between the ruling Conservatives and Labour, with the other parties on course to secure only a modest number of seats – a break with recent elections.
Finally, the political centre of gravity has shifted to the left, with in particular tax rates likely to rise regardless of which party wins next week’s election.
My core scenario is a hollow victory for the Conservatives: 360-370 seats with a low voter turnout. This would reduce the risk of opposition parties and rebel Conservative MPs torpedoing government legislation but would fall short of the landslide victory which Conservatives thought possible back in April.
Finally, a modest (or even significant) increase in the Conservative’s parliamentary majority is unlikely to materially improve the government’s hand when negotiating with the EU.
Read UK Election Special – When Two Tribes Go To War in full on my website.
Labels:
2017,
Elections,
Olivier Desbarres,
UK
Monday, 15 May 2017
2017 French elections – They think it’s all over…it isn’t
Emmanuel Macron, the centrist founder of the En Marche! movement beat National Front candidate Marine Le Pen by two votes to one in the second and final round of the French presidential elections on 7th May, in line with my core scenario.
But for President-elect Macron (and arguably the other main party leaders), the hard work starts now. Macron is expected to appoint next week his Prime Minister and there has been much speculation.
I would expect Macron to pick a head of government and approve cabinet ministers who will not polarise political opinion. The appointment of a “rainbow government” would likely help his party – recently renamed “La République En Marche” – secure the largest number of deputies at the forthcoming legislative elections on 11th and 18th June.
If his party succeeds as opinion polls suggest – no mean feat for a party which is only a year old and currently has no parliamentary deputies – this would in turn help reinforce Macron’s position and his choice of Prime Minister.
However, polls suggest that La République En Marche may fail to secure a majority of the 577 seats in the National Assembly.
If the party falls well short of that number, it would likely seek a loose coalition with either the Republican Party or less likely with the beleaguered Socialist Party, in my view.
The National Front is likely to cement its position in French politics but it will need to reform itself and I would expect personnel changes and policy tweaks.
Marine Le Pen fell well short of securing the presidency and this should have come as no great surprise as nationalist parties in other EU member states have also come up short.
This is in line with my view that while nationalist/populist parties may have greater influence on the political landscape they will in most cases fail to exercise true power, let alone dismantle the eurozone and/or EU.
Finally, opinion polls which predicted with great accuracy the second and in particular first round of the presidential elections, are back in favour – at least in France.
But for President-elect Macron (and arguably the other main party leaders), the hard work starts now. Macron is expected to appoint next week his Prime Minister and there has been much speculation.
I would expect Macron to pick a head of government and approve cabinet ministers who will not polarise political opinion. The appointment of a “rainbow government” would likely help his party – recently renamed “La République En Marche” – secure the largest number of deputies at the forthcoming legislative elections on 11th and 18th June.
If his party succeeds as opinion polls suggest – no mean feat for a party which is only a year old and currently has no parliamentary deputies – this would in turn help reinforce Macron’s position and his choice of Prime Minister.
However, polls suggest that La République En Marche may fail to secure a majority of the 577 seats in the National Assembly.
If the party falls well short of that number, it would likely seek a loose coalition with either the Republican Party or less likely with the beleaguered Socialist Party, in my view.
The National Front is likely to cement its position in French politics but it will need to reform itself and I would expect personnel changes and policy tweaks.
Marine Le Pen fell well short of securing the presidency and this should have come as no great surprise as nationalist parties in other EU member states have also come up short.
This is in line with my view that while nationalist/populist parties may have greater influence on the political landscape they will in most cases fail to exercise true power, let alone dismantle the eurozone and/or EU.
Finally, opinion polls which predicted with great accuracy the second and in particular first round of the presidential elections, are back in favour – at least in France.
Read the full article on my website Here.
Friday, 28 April 2017
US, UK and global GDP growth update – Put the champagne on ice
US GDP data weakest of a disappointing lot....
Data released today show that Q1 2017 real GDP growth:
- In the US slowed to 0.7 quarter-on-quarter (qoq) annualised, from 2.1% qoq in Q4 2016 – the weakest growth rate in three years (see Figure 1);
- In the UK halved to 0.3% qoq – the weakest growth rate in a year;
- In France slowed to 0.3% qoq from 0.5% qoq in Q4 2016; and
- In Spain rose to 0.8% qoq from 0.7% qoq in Q4 2016.
Read the full article on my website.
Labels:
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Friday, 21 April 2017
French politics, UK macro data and possible GBP/EUR downside
The GBP/EUR cross is at year-highs but continues to struggle to breach the 1.20 mark, as it did on a number of occasions in the second half of 2016. Sterling has been buoyed by British Prime Minister Theresa May’s call for early general elections on 8th June while the euro remains in reasonably narrow trading ranges as we head into Sunday’s French presidential election first round.
With four presidential candidates polling between 18.5% and 23.5%, it is still a close call (see Figure 1). But I am sticking to my core scenario that independent centre-left candidate Emmanuel Macron will fill one of the top two spots to make it to the 7th May run-off, which I my view would be welcomed by French financial markets and the euro even if markets remain jittery over the next fortnight (see The Ultimate Guide to the 2017 French Elections, Part IV, 13 April 2017).
At the same time, the ever-changing political scene in the UK can do little near-term to avert the headwinds to GDP growth stemming from falling real wages and retail sales. With this in mind, I see the risk to GBP/EUR biased to the downside in coming weeks, particularly if both Macron and Republican candidate François Fillon earn their place in the second round.
Read the full article here.
Tuesday, 18 April 2017
The Ultimate Guide to the 2017 French Elections – Part IV
The outcome of the first round on 23rd April remains a close call and I am once again reminded of President de Gaulle who, in a nod to the French electorate’s heterogeneity, asked how it was possible to govern a country where 258 varieties of cheese exist.
This granular political landscape has come into focus in recent weeks. Polls show that in the first round National Front candidate Marine Le Pen and the centre-left independent Emmanuel Macron are still slightly ahead of far-left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Republican François Fillon but the margins are barely statistically insignificant.
Moreover, a large share of voters – up to 45% of the registered electorate – remain undecided on whether and how they will vote. These voters will likely swing the election.
Nevertheless, I am sticking to my core scenario that Macron will make it to the second round which he would win regardless of whom he faces given his strong cross-party political support and reasonably high popularity amongst voters.
While all the main candidate advocate some kind of reform of the EU and eurozone, Le Pen is campaigning on the premise that France needs to leave the eurozone and has promised to hold a referendum on France’s EU membership if elected.
Implied euro volatility has surged – a trend partly attributed to markets pricing in a higher probability of either Mélenchon or Le Pen being elected president. But actual euro volatility remains subdued and the fall in the euro and 2 and 5-year French government bond prices in recent weeks has been modest.
The consensus forecast, which I share, is that the Euro and French government bonds will rally if Macron or Fillon is elected president while the Euro would weaken sharply and French yields rise significantly should Le Pen or Mélenchon become president.
However, with an almost infinite number of scenarios to consider, any forecast of where European financial markets may end up and how they get there remains tentative at best.
There has been little focus on the elections for the French National Assembly, to be held over two rounds on 11th and 18thJune and yet they will decide the composition of one of France’s law-making institutions and dictate from which party hails the Prime Minister.
Unless Fillon becomes President, it is likely that for the next five years the President and Prime Minister will not come from the same party or share the same political agenda – a period of “Cohabitation” which would clip the authority of Le Pen, Mélenchon and to a lesser extent Macron, and is usually associated with political instability.
Read the full article here.
Friday, 24 March 2017
Bank of England and Inflation – Sense of Déjà-vu?
UK retail sales in Q1 likely contracted from Q4 2016, despite their rebound in February.
Falling real wages and slowing household borrowing are likely to further dampen retail sales and consumption growth going forward.
The still large pool of available workers is seemingly limiting their wage-bargaining power, with nominal wage growth falling behind rising inflation.
Moreover, investment growth is still only making a negligible contribution to GDP growth ahead of the British government’s decision to trigger Article 50 on 29th March.
Much of the rise in inflation in recent months is attributable to imported inflation driven by Sterling’s depreciation since November 2015 with little evidence of demand-led inflation.
This situation is reminiscent of 2007-2008 when Sterling’s collapse fuelled imported and in turn headline inflation.
Should Sterling remain broadly unchanged going forward, its year-on-year pace of depreciation, currently around 9%, would slow from June onwards and hit zero towards end-year according to my estimates, in turn dampening imported inflation.
I would expect retailers to stabilise prices to maintain market share in the face of tepid demand and for wage-inflation expectations to remain modest. This was certainly the case in the 12 months to September 2009 with CPI-inflation falling from 5.2% yoy to 1.1% yoy.
The question is whether the BoE is willing to look beyond a potentially temporary rise in UK inflation – as Governor Mark Carney suggested – or whether it tries to short-circuit any self-reinforcing rise in prices.
My base-line scenario is that the BoE will look beyond the current rise in UK inflation, unless at least one of three conditions materialise:
(1) Nominal wage growth accelerates, comfortably outstripping headline inflation and driving consumption growth;
(2) Commercial bank lending picks up significantly; and
(3) Sterling depreciates materially from current levels, exacerbating imported and in turn headline inflation.
I expect that neither (1) or (2) will materialise any time soon and that while risks to Sterling are probably to the downside, Sterling is unlikely to weaken sufficiently to push the BoE into hiking. I would however expect it to keep a possible rate hike firmly on the table.
Falling real wages and slowing household borrowing are likely to further dampen retail sales and consumption growth going forward.
The still large pool of available workers is seemingly limiting their wage-bargaining power, with nominal wage growth falling behind rising inflation.
Moreover, investment growth is still only making a negligible contribution to GDP growth ahead of the British government’s decision to trigger Article 50 on 29th March.
Much of the rise in inflation in recent months is attributable to imported inflation driven by Sterling’s depreciation since November 2015 with little evidence of demand-led inflation.
This situation is reminiscent of 2007-2008 when Sterling’s collapse fuelled imported and in turn headline inflation.
Should Sterling remain broadly unchanged going forward, its year-on-year pace of depreciation, currently around 9%, would slow from June onwards and hit zero towards end-year according to my estimates, in turn dampening imported inflation.
I would expect retailers to stabilise prices to maintain market share in the face of tepid demand and for wage-inflation expectations to remain modest. This was certainly the case in the 12 months to September 2009 with CPI-inflation falling from 5.2% yoy to 1.1% yoy.
The question is whether the BoE is willing to look beyond a potentially temporary rise in UK inflation – as Governor Mark Carney suggested – or whether it tries to short-circuit any self-reinforcing rise in prices.
My base-line scenario is that the BoE will look beyond the current rise in UK inflation, unless at least one of three conditions materialise:
(1) Nominal wage growth accelerates, comfortably outstripping headline inflation and driving consumption growth;
(2) Commercial bank lending picks up significantly; and
(3) Sterling depreciates materially from current levels, exacerbating imported and in turn headline inflation.
I expect that neither (1) or (2) will materialise any time soon and that while risks to Sterling are probably to the downside, Sterling is unlikely to weaken sufficiently to push the BoE into hiking. I would however expect it to keep a possible rate hike firmly on the table.
Read the full article here.
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