Showing posts with label Economics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Economics. Show all posts

Friday, 13 October 2017

My Top Currency Charts

My macro & FX analysis is premised on both a detailed qualitative assessment of Emerging and G20 fixed income markets and economies and a rigorous quantitative analysis of data, trends, policy decisions and global events too often taken at face-value.

A picture can say a thousand words and a well-constructed and timely chart can shed light on often complex economic and market developments and challenge engrained assumptions.

Ideally, a chart will be forward-looking and a valuable tool in helping forecast economic and market developments and ascertain whether possible market mis-pricing may trigger turning-points or corrections.

There are of course limits to what even the best chart can do, with in particular the line between correlation and causation sometimes blurred. One should also be weary of reading too much into sometimes limited or patchy data sets and underlying data sources can add to or detract from the chart’s credibility.

Moreover, a chart can lose its potency over time, so while on average my research notes include about a dozen charts and tables I am constantly adding new ones.

I have re-published and updated below a small cross-section of the currency-specific charts which continue to play a central part in my narrative and forecasts, including:
  1. Global Nominal Effective Exchange Rates (NEERs)
  2. Euro and government bond yield spreads
  3. Sterling NEER
  4. Sterling NEER and annual pace of appreciation/depreciation
  5. The Renminbi NEER
  6. Renminbi NEER and monthly pace of appreciation/depreciation
I will in coming weeks expand on other notable charts and for a more detailed analysis I would refer you to my previously published (hyperlinked) research notes.

Read the full article on my website.

Tuesday, 8 August 2017

Broken Records

The past year has been remarkable with political precedents set in the US, UK and France, still record-low central bank policy rates in most developed economies and financial markets and macro data at all-time or multi-year highs (and lows).

The US presidency is fraught with problems but markets turning are a blind eye…for now. The UK is still on course to be first ever member state to leave the European Union come 29th March 2019, at least on paper. French elections have repainted the political landscape and present many opportunities but old (fiscal) hurdles still need to be cleared.

Central bank policy rates remain at record lows in the majority of developed economies, including the Eurozone, UK, Japan, Australia and New Zealand and I expect this to remain the case for the remainder of the year. Loose global monetary policy is likely to continue providing a floor to risky assets, including equities and emerging market currencies.

A number of central banks have hiked 25bp in recent months, including the Fed, BoC and CNB, in line with my year-old view that rate hikes would gradually replace rate cuts. But in aggregate the turnaround in developed central bank monetary policy is proceeding at a glacial pace and I see few reasons why this should change.

The Bank of England has not hiked its policy rate for 526 weeks – a domestic record – and I continue to believe that this stretch will extend into 2018.

In contrast to the Dollar and Sterling, the Euro – by far the most stable major currency in the past seven years – has appreciated over 7% since early April.

While the ECB may want to slow the current rapid pace of Euro appreciation, it is unlikely to stop, let alone reverse, the Euro’s upward path at this stage. For starters, Eurozone growth and labour markets continue to strengthen. The German IFO business climate index hit three consecutive record highs in June-August.

Perhaps the most obvious record which financial markets have broken is the continued climb in US equities to new highs and volatility’s fall to near-record lows.

Emerging market rates continue to edge lower in the face of receding inflationary risks and I see room for further rate cuts, particularly in Brazil given the pace of Real appreciation.

Non-Japan Asian (NJA) currencies continue to broadly tread water, in line with my core view that NJA central banks have little incentive to materially alter their currencies’ paths.

Year-to-date emerging market equities have rallied 24%, twice as fast as the Dow Jones (12%) which has rallied twice as fast as EM currencies versus the Dollar (6%).

Read 'Broken Records' in full on my website.

Friday, 28 July 2017

No UK rate hikes this year and room for further Euro upside

The odds of a 25bp Bank of England rate hike at next week’s policy meeting are all but dead in my view following tepid GDP growth of 0.3% qoq in Q2 2017.

Moreover, UK GDP growth and inflation dynamics, allied to forthcoming changes in the composition of the Monetary Policy Council, point to the record-low policy rate of 0.25% remaining on hold for the remainder of the year.

Forecasting European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy, including the timing and modalities of changes to its Quantitative Easing program, is arguably a far trickier proposition.

While the ECB may be incentivised to slow the current rapid pace of Euro appreciation, at this stage I do not expect the ECB to try and to stop, let alone reverse, the Euro’s upward path.

Read the full article on my website.

Wednesday, 31 May 2017

Asian currencies keeping their head in a world losing its own

Financial markets have had much to digest in recent weeks and the calendar for the remainder of May and June is anything but light, with the Fed and ECB holding key policy meetings and legislative elections in both the UK and France.

Nevertheless, most major currencies have either been flat or appreciated against a slowly weakening Dollar in the past month, with only the high yielding Brazilian Real, Russian Rouble and Indian Rupee (INR) and Australian Dollar weakening by 0.5% or more.

Conversely, European currencies have outperformed, with in particular the Euro Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) up about 3.4% since mid-April – in line with my constructive near-term euro outlook.

Non-Japan Asian (NJA) NEERs have seen only very modest moves in the past month. Bar the Malaysian Ringgit NEER which is up about 1.1% and the INR NEER which is down about 1.7%, NJA NEERs have appreciated or depreciated by less than 1%.

The question is whether this relative calm in NJA currency markets is likely to become more entrenched or whether FX flows and/or central bank policy are likely to fuel greater volatility or see some currencies adopting a clearer direction.

As a starting point, I would again note that the pace of depreciation and appreciation in most NJA currencies tends to be confined to reasonably narrow ranges.

While this is partly a by-product of seasonal patterns in current account balances and the ebbs and flows in capital migrations, it also arguably reflects central banks’ desire and scope to control their currencies.

At this juncture I would conclude that few central banks – including the MAS and PBoC – face overwhelming economic reasons to markedly alter the paths of their currencies via the bias of FX intervention and/or interest rate policy.

There is however perhaps a case for Bank Negara Malaysia to favour a weaker or at least stable Ringgit NEER which has appreciated about 2.7% since mid-April.

Friday, 28 April 2017

US, UK and global GDP growth update – Put the champagne on ice


US GDP data weakest of a disappointing lot....

Data released today show that Q1 2017 real GDP growth:
  • In the US slowed to 0.7 quarter-on-quarter (qoq) annualised, from 2.1% qoq in Q4 2016 – the weakest growth rate in three years (see Figure 1);
  • In the UK halved to 0.3% qoq – the weakest growth rate in a year;
  • In France slowed to 0.3% qoq from 0.5% qoq in Q4 2016; and
  • In Spain rose to 0.8% qoq from 0.7% qoq in Q4 2016.

Read the full article on my website.

Tuesday, 7 March 2017

The Ultimate Guide to the 2017 French Elections – Part I

The first round of the French Presidential elections is due to be held in 47 days, with the likely second round two weeks later. There has already been much drama in a presidential campaign that has caught the world’s imagination.

The two-round election for the 577 deputies of the lower house of parliament on 11th and 18th June, which has so far received little attention, will complete the political picture in France.

There are currently eighteen presidential candidates spanning the breadth of the political spectrum, from the far-left to the far-right. Political jostling is in full swing with candidates forming alliances in a bid to capture the 46 million or so votes up for grabs in round one.

The National Front’s Marine Le Pen, currently ahead in the polls for the first round on around 27%, is looking to go one step further than her father Jean-Marie Le Pen and become the first ever French female president. She is currently under investigation for misappropriation of EU funds and publication of violent images.

The centre-left candidate Emmanuel Macron, aged 39, is second in the polls on around 25%. He is vying to become the first centrist president since Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in 1974, the first independent candidate to become France’s head of state and the youngest ever President under the Fifth Republic.

Republican candidate François Fillon, who comfortably won the party primaries, is third in the polls on around 20% despite the probability that he will face formal charges on 15th March of misappropriation of parliamentary funds.

President de Gaulle, in a nod to the heterogeneity of the French electorate, famously asked how it was possible to govern a country where 258 varieties of cheese exist. This granular political landscape makes it that much harder to predict with any certainty the successor to incumbent President François Hollande who has opted not to run for a second term.

This in-depth four-part Election Series will examine all core elements of the upcoming presidential and legislative elections and take both a quantitative and qualitative approach.

The material, organised in easy-to-access questions and answers, will ultimately try to answer the key question of who will be President and Prime Minister and how this will impact France, Europe and financial markets. The British decision to leave the EU and US presidential elections have fuelled the notion that anything is possible.

In Part I, I examine the importance of French presidential and legislative elections, their mechanics and timelines and the implications of a potentially high voter turnout.

Friday, 27 January 2017

Tradespotting: Choose protectionism. Choose higher inflation. Choose weaker trade and growth

The future of global trade, which has slowed despite a pick-up in global GDP growth, is hogging the headlines, with the spotlight on both the US and UK.

US President Trump and his team have so far focused on (1) substituting US imports for domestic production, with Trump adopting a carrot-and-stick approach (2) trade in goods, particularly manufactured goods and (3) trade with China and regional trading partners and in particular Mexico.

There is in theory nothing irrational in President Trump wanting to boost domestic production and exports, narrow the $500bn trade deficit and spur US employment.

However, his current approach may in practise fall well short of delivering the improvement in US trade and jobs which he seeks. In a more extreme scenario, his tactics could at least in the near-term lead to higher US inflation and weaker trade, creating headwinds for both the US and global economy.

The high-labour cost US economy should be looking to better compete with the likes of Germany, not China. But the quality and desirability of exports matters.

The Dollar’s strength, over which the Trump administration has little or no control, will likely continue to weigh on the overall competitiveness of US exports while at the same time fuelling cheap US imports.

A stronger Renminbi is not the solution as exporting nations other than the US may be better positioned to capitalise on such a relative-price change, while the USD-cost of imports from China may rise.

If the US imposed higher tariffs on imports from China and other countries (such as Mexico), it would take time for US-based companies to boost production given insufficient quality and capacity in US manufacturing.

Moreover, China and other exporting nations such as Mexico and Canada may respond to higher US import tariffs by increasing their tariffs on imports from the US. This would put US exporters at a clear disadvantage vis-à-vis other exporting nations.

Monday, 9 January 2017

Chinese Renminbi – Squaring the circle


China’s exchange rate policy is one of many significant uncertainties or “known-unknowns” for 2017 (as it arguably was in 2016 and prior years).

The market’s focus is still very much on the rise in USD-CNY but Chinese policy-makers are keen to emphasise the importance of the Renminbi’s performance against a basket of currencies – the CNY Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER). This comes as no surprise.

The monthly pace of CNY NEER appreciation or depreciation has rarely exceeded 3% in the past seven years, suggesting that policy-makers have sought to control the Renminbi’s rate of change.

Large (and well documented) capital outflows from China have been the main source of Renminbi pressure but China’s current account surplus-to-GDP ratio has also edged lower to around 2.5% due to a rising deficit in the services balance. This perhaps dents the argument that the Renminbi is still materially undervalued.

Moreover, despite the Renminbi’s gain in competitiveness in the past year, China’s trade surplus has somewhat counter-intuitively shrunk, not increased. This may be due to price effects outweighing demand-effects (for exports) and still strong credit-fuelled Chinese imports.

In response to quarterly capital outflows of between $100bn and $200bn since late 2015, the PBoC intervened in the FX market to the tune of about $280bn in January-November.

This strong commitment likely reflects the perceived economic and geopolitical benefits of limiting the Renminbi’s depreciation.

Near-term, I think the PBoC may continue to see some value in a broadly stable Renminbi or only very modest CNY NEER depreciation. If capital outflows re-accelerate this would likely require the introduction of further capital controls and aggressive FX intervention. This is certainly an option in the short-run.

If capital outflows stabilise or recede, the PBoC may be able to slow or even stop FX intervention. This is not a totally unfeasible scenario if global yields stabilise and a slightly stronger CNY attracts capital back into China or if capital controls take greater effect.

In the more unlikely scenario whereby China experiences capital inflows, which last happened in Q1 2014, I would expect the PBoC to have limited appetite for rapid and/or sustained Renminbi appreciation and instead use this opportunity to rebuild FX reserves.



Wednesday, 4 January 2017

Paradox of acute uncertainty and strong consensus views


There appears to be a quasi-universal belief that 2017 will be characterised by acute uncertainty, with the list of difficult-to-predict economic and political variables growing exponentially in recent months.

These include the paths which Donald Trump will tread in the US and Theresa May in the UK, the Fed’s reaction function, the future of the eurozone and EU with European elections looming, the perennial question of China’s exchange rate policy and outlook for oil prices.

And yet, there is already it would seem a set of strong consensus views about the direction which economic variables and financial markets will follow in 2017.

US reflationary policies are expected to rule, boosting already decent US economic growth, inflation and US equities, in turn forcing the Fed to adopt a far more hawkish stance than in 2015-2016 and pushing US yields and dollar higher.

At the same time, President-elect Trump’s penchant for protectionism, alongside a strong dollar and higher US yields, are seen as major headwinds for indebted emerging economies reliant on trade and by implication for emerging currencies, bonds and equities. These seemingly include the Mexican Peso and Chinese Renminbi.

Moreover, the consensus forecast is that at the very least EUR/USD will fall below parity, having got close in December.

The perception of acute uncertainty is not totally incompatible with seemingly well-anchored forecasts but they do make uncomfortable bed-fellows.

Some of the uncertainties which have gained prominence can be put to rest, for now at least. At the same time, some of the sure-fire trades currently advocated may struggle to stand the test of time, in my view.

Marine Le Pen is very unlikely to become the next French President, the Italian banking sector will not be allowed to implode and the euro may end the year on a strong note.

Emerging market currencies have showed greater poise in the past few weeks, with a number of central banks showing both the appetite and the room to support their currencies. This should be borne in mind.

Thursday, 8 December 2016

Black Swans and White Doves

In the past week European and global politics, strong US growth data, mixed global macro numbers and eurozone, Chinese and Indian central bank policy have eclipsed Trump-mania.

What is perhaps more remarkable is markets’ reasonably benign, “risk-on” reaction, bar the euro’s sell-off in the wake of today’s ECB policy meeting.

One interpretation is that markets have become complacent to the risks presented by President Trump’s constellation of pseudo-policies, surging nationalism in Europe, the UK’s uncertain economic future and continued capital outflows from China.

I have a somewhat different take, namely that markets are rightly discounting some of the more extreme and perverse scenarios, including:
  1. Protectionist US policies coupled with higher US yields and a strong dollar collapsing tepid emerging market, and eventually global, economic growth;
  2. The “no” vote in the Italian referendum leading to the economic collapse of the European Union’s third largest economy;
  3. Surging European nationalism culminating in the collapse of the eurozone and/or European Union;
  4. The British government opting to sacrifice growth in exchange for a hard version of Brexit and;
  5. Capital outflows from China ultimately forcing policy-makers into accepting a Renminbi collapse and shocking a corporate sector with significant dollar-debt.

Read the full article on my website.

Friday, 2 December 2016

Renzi Referendum Frenzy – Storm in a Brittle Tea Cup


All eyes are riveted to the Italian referendum on constitutional reform due on Sunday 4th December.

The “no” vote is still ahead in the polls, even if the past 18 months should have taught us to be weary of polls’ predictive powers.

The worst-case-scenario advanced centres on reformist Prime Minister Renzi’s resignation, the rise to power of the euro-sceptic Five Star Movement (M5S), a jump in Italian bond yields, the fragile banking sector and economy’s collapse and Italy’s eventual exit from the eurozone and EU.

The more likely political, financial and economic outcome from a “no” vote is perhaps less dramatic, in my view, and financial markets, including the euro, have been reasonably well behaved in the run-up to the referendum.

A “no” vote may well usher in a less reform-minded technocratic government and fuel support for the populist M5S and its leader Beppe Grillo but their path to the top will not be straightforward.

The banking sector, riddled with bad-loans and planning a recapitalisation of its balance-sheet, can ill afford the negative press a “no” vote may bring. But both Italian and eurozone policy-makers have a strong incentive to shore up Italian banks and the economy, even if posturing may precede an eventual solution.

The ECB may well extend its QE program at its policy meeting on 8th December in order to help alleviate any stress in eurozone markets but I don’t expect other major central banks to follow suit with monetary policy loosening of their own near-term.

Finally, while the future of the eurozone and EU has been written off many times, I don’t envisage Italy being the trigger for a break-up of either.

Read the full article on my website here.

Nationalism, French presidential elections and the euro

The shock results of US presidential elections and UK referendum are shining the spotlight on the rise of nationalist and populist policies.

The rejection of the political, economic and social status-quo has lead to increasingly vocal predictions that populist and/or nationalist parties will cause major upsets at forthcoming elections in EU member states, including Italy and Austria. 

But forecasts that a broad-sweep of nationalist parties will rise to the highest political echelons in EU countries may still be far-fetched. 

In most cases these parties still command only modest popular support which can be overstated in polls and difficult to translate into actual political power.

France is such an example. Support for Marine Le Pen, leader and presidential candidate of the far-right Front National (FN) party, has risen in recent years and she will likely make it to the second round of presidential elections in April-May 2017.

But she is unlikely to become President, with opinion polls showing she would lose the head-to-head vote, almost irrespective of the candidate she faces.

Moreover, the FN is likely to remain a minority party following next June’s elections for the French Assembly.

France’s presidential and parliamentary elections will in any case have far more modest repercussions for the global economy and asset markets than the election of Donald Trump in the US. 

Even in the very unlikely event of Marine Le Pen becoming president, the impact on the euro could be modest and short-lived as France’s economy accounts for only 21% of the eurozone’s economy.
ECB policy and German elections due in September 2017 are likely to exert greater influence on the euro’s path. 

It is also noteworthy that the euro has been one of the most stable major currencies in the past six-and-a-half years, despite the Greek crisis and the shock UK referendum result.

Read the full article on my website.

Tuesday, 15 November 2016

Fast and Furious – Market Drift


Markets’ reactions in the four days following Donald Trump’s surprise victory in last week’s US presidential elections has lent support, in some cases somewhat perversely, to my underlying view that:
  • Central banks and markets were at an inflexion point. My central premise was that slowly rising global GDP growth and inflation was starting to alter major central banks’ thinking, with developed central banks increasingly unlikely to cut policy rates and/or boost/expand their QE programs. The market implication was that global yields had probably bottomed out and that greater market volatility would likely accompany the transition to higher yields (see Central bank easing nearing important inflexion point, 16 September 2016).
  • The US Federal Reserve (Fed) would hike its policy rate 25bp at its meeting on 14th December; and
  • The dollar nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), which is now up about 2.8% year-to-date, would strengthen in 2016 for a third consecutive year, albeit more modestly than in 2014 and 2015 when it appreciated 10% and 12% respectively.
Read the full article on my website: Fast and Furious – Market Drift

Friday, 4 November 2016

So much change – so little difference

Events, data and price action in recent days have provided much debate and if anything reinforce my view that volatility in asset prices is unlikely to be tamed any time soon (see Be careful what you wish for, 1 November 2016). The odds of Donald Trump winning next week’s US presidential elections have gone up, the probability of the UK opting for hard Brexit has come down, US data have been mixed and global yields and equities have come off. But ultimately I do not think the underlying picture has changed as much.

Friday, 7 October 2016

Barbarians at the Sterling Gate


Sterling’s collapse overnight has eclipsed somewhat tepid US labour market data.

The net result is that the Sterling NEER has weakened a further 2% since yesterday and is now down about 20% since November 2015.

While trading desks will have a far better grasp of how risk management systems and liquidity contributed to sterling’s drop, recent political decisions and UK data clearly helped set the scene and will leave the currency vulnerable going forward.

Theresa May’s government and EU leaders have in recent weeks successively dismantled the raft of hopeful predictions which had helped Sterling stabilise over the summer.

Moreover, there is growing evidence that a more competitive Sterling has not translated into materially stronger UK industrial output or exports, with the UK’s trade deficit in goods and services widening in recent months

I would reiterate my view, expressed in early July, that the uncertainty associated with the UK’s possible exit from the EU will likely continue to weigh on the UK economy and currency.

This week’s fall in sterling, if anything, has reinforced my view that the Bank of England will maintain a dovish rhetoric but for now refrain from cutting its policy rate to zero or expanding its current QE program.

Moreover I would not expect the BoE to intervene in the FX market to support sterling at this stage.

Read the full article on my website.

Tuesday, 30 August 2016

UK economy post referendum – for richer, but mostly for poorer

We may well never know the true extent of the impact of the EU referendum outcome on the British economy, markets and ultimately standards of living. This may not be the most satisfying conclusion, but this uncertainty is one which policy-makers will have to grapple with.

As to the bigger question of whether the UK is better off today or will be better off in years to come when one takes into account not only the impact on the economy but also broader, less tangible issues such as sovereignty, the answer is and will likely remain even more subjective.

In any case, available data paint a patchy picture of the UK economy post-referendum. Construction and services have been harder hit than manufacturing. Retail sales were strong in July thanks in part to a robust labour market and plentiful lending. While this defies the collapse in consumer confidence temporary factors may also have been at play.

The residential property market at a national level has been softer but resilient post referendum. Mortgage lending remains depressed but government policies are for now more likely to blame. The commercial property market has been harder hit.

Sterling’s 10% collapse since the referendum, following a 10% depreciation between November and June, is seemingly supporting economic growth and demand for UK assets even if history suggests that it is no panacea. Its inflationary impact has so far been very modest but the risk is a squeeze on profit margins and real wages.

At the same time sterling’s collapse has tangibly eroded the UK’s net wealth, at least when expressed in foreign-currency terms – a fact largely ignored by policy-makers and the media.
I would expect the BoE to continue favouring monetary and credit policies which explicitly help spur lending, spending and investment and, implicitly at least, help cap sterling. While this may not translate into another policy rate cut or round of QE near-term, the BoE is likely to keep this option firmly on the table if the UK economy fails to return to trend in the next six months.

To read my further thoughts on the UK Economy after the Brexit vote, read the full article on my website.

Thursday, 14 July 2016

Bank of England rate cut – Seven years in the making

For the past few years, the Bank of England’s MPC meetings have been pretty straightforward affairs, with the policy rate firmly on hold at its record low of 0.5%.

But the referendum result has dramatically changed the British political landscape and amplified the uncertainty over the near and long-term outlook for the UK economy.

A 25bp rate cut today is perhaps not quite the foregone conclusion which markets are almost fully pricing in. The BoE could today make valid arguments both to support a 25bp rate cut and no change.

On balance, however, I think the BoE has more compelling reasons to cut its policy rate 25bp today than to leave it on hold.

First, BoE Governor Carney has made clear that a rate cut was potentially on the cards, making it harder for him to backtrack.

Second, the British economy was showing clear signs of weakness even before the referendum.

Third, there are signs that economic and political uncertainty post referendum are already having a negative impact on consumption, investment and confidence.

Finally, the BoE may be the only game in town for now as there is limited room for domestic fiscal policy and global monetary policy reflation.

But cutting the policy rate to 25bp or even zero is clearly no panacea to the challenges which the UK faces in coming weeks, months and perhaps even years and there are valid counter-arguments as to why the BoE may leave its policy rate on hold today.

These include that the BoE should save its (limited) bullets and wait for more hard data, a BoE rate cut would set in motion self-fulfilling prophecy, the BoE should balance post-referendum chaos with a steady policy rate, the global equity market rebound has removed the sense of urgency and a rate cut could trigger uncontrolled Sterling depreciation.

Regardless of today’s decision, the BoE’s accompanying minutes will likely try to capture this new paradigm.

A rate cut today would still leave the BoE the option of cutting rates again at its 4th August meeting but negative interest rate policy and/or quantitative easing are still likely to be measures of last resort.

Wednesday, 15 June 2016

It’s oh so quiet…for now

Frequent u-turns in the Fed’s policy stance, central banks’ lack of monetary policy credibility, currency wars and gyrations in macro data are being blamed for financial market volatility and record lows in government bond yields. The forthcoming EU referendum has also buffeted UK financial markets.

But on the whole, financial markets and macro data have since 1 April showed a far greater degree of stability than in preceding quarters.

US interest rate, equity and currency markets have weathered the gyrations in the Fed’s policy stance and the ebbs and flows in US data. German and Japanese government bond yields have fallen but ultimately been less volatile than in Q1. The World Equity Index has also been constrained in a reasonably narrow range, thanks at least in part to signs that global GDP growth stabilised in Q1.

This relative stability has not been confined to the dollar. So far, Q2 2016 has been the least volatile quarter since January 2015 – as defined by the low-high range using daily data – for most major nominal effective exchange rates (NEERs). These include developed and EM currencies, as well as commodity and non-commodity currencies. Among G7 currencies, the euro NEER has been particularly stable in a 2.1% range.

The picture is also one of relative calm in emerging markets, with the pick-up in foreign capital inflows in April and June and in commodity prices since March helping to stabilise EM currencies without central banks having to draw on still significant FX reserves.

Commodity prices, including crude oil, have risen sharply so far in Q2 but their volatility has remained in line with historical standards, particularly in recent weeks. This has contributed to greater stability in commodity currencies, with the exception of the Australian dollar.

If anything, this lack of directionality has forced financial market players to be light-footed and adopt short-term tactical strategies. The question now is whether this relative calm is here to stay or whether it augurs more violent corrections as was the case earlier this year.

The UK referendum on EU accession has the potential to be far more destabilising to financial markets than the BoJ’s policy meeting on 16 June and in particular the Fed’s meeting the day before. While UK markets would likely feel the brunt of a decision to leave the EU, the euro would also likely weaken and global equity markets conceivably sell off.

The Fed’s policy meeting on 27th July could also prove disruptive at a time of potentially reduced summer-liquidity.

Read the full article on my website.


Friday, 13 May 2016

US Economy Not at Full Employment


Markets, which tend to focus on US non-farm payrolls and the unemployment rate, may be relying on an incomplete and arguably inaccurate picture of the US labour market which fails to fully take into account a still sizeable pool of available workers.

Job creation has been robust in recent years, but the working age population has also increased while the share of full-time employees remains modest. As a result, the ratio of the working-age population employed in full-time jobs, currently 48.7%, remains well below its historical average.

Importantly this ratio tends to lead the growth rate in private sector employees’ hourly earnings and points to earnings growth only rising modestly in coming months from around 2.4% year-on-year.

The policy implication, all other things being equal, is that the Federal Reserve may not have to worry near-term about a tight labour market boosting pay-packets and in turn wage-led inflation. With US GDP growth having collapsed in Q1, global growth having slowed further to around 2.6% year-on-year and global PMI and Chinese trade data showing little bounce in April, the Fed’s decision to keep rates on hold so far this year is at least defendable.

My core scenario of one or two Fed rate hikes this year remains feasible but my expectation that the Fed would pull the trigger in June will likely be proven wrong. The Fed fund futures market has all but discounted a mid-year hike, currently pricing in a probability of only 8% for a 25bp hike, versus 23% back on 26 April.

Read the full article on my website.

Thursday, 28 April 2016

Fed pulls off 40-word Houdini


The Fed kept rates on hold yesterday – pretty much a done deal – and its statement yesterday following its two-day policy meeting was very short on new insights.

But it was in line with my expectation that while the Fed would present a marginally less dovish assessment of the global economy, it would paint a still cloudy picture of the US and nurse the recently faltering rally in global risk appetite. US equities closed up 0.3% yesterday and 2, 5 and 10yr US treasury yields are down 6-10bps since Tuesday.

The Fed faces seven rocky weeks ahead of its 15th June meeting. It will likely want to keep the door ajar for a hike and will therefore not want to see US yields break out of range. But the market’s violent reaction today to the BoJ’s unchanged monetary policy is also a stark reminder that an overly-hawkish Fed could derail global risk appetite and in turn delay any Fed hikes.

With this in mind, my core scenario of a June is likely to be tested in coming weeks and the risk remains that flat-lining emerging market currencies will come under pressure.

Read the full article here.